boeing performance software manual

boeing performance software manual

Nobody would expect anything to do with a Boeing 747 to be particularly cheap, but we almost fell off our chairs this morning when we read how much one crucial part of the new Air Force Ones was going to cost. And what was that item. A complicated bit of software. Some modified landing gear. No, according to a report in The Drive today, this was the cost of the manuals alone. Building a new presidential transport is never going to be cheap. Photo: Pxhere Why so expensive. The US Air Force is poised to replace its aging VC-25 aircraft, popularly known as Air Force One (but only when the President is on board). To take over this vital role, the Air Force is purchasing a pair of modified Boeing 747-8is, known as VC-25Bs. These two aircraft were once the property of now-defunct Russian airline Transaero. Advertisement: Although there are a fair number of 747-8is in operation around the world, 47 to be precise, the Air Force can’t just acquire a standard manual for these long haul workhorses. The VC-25Bs will be rather unique in comparison to their commercial brethren, and this is part of the reason the flight manual costs so much. Specifically, the new VC-25s will be fitted with some of the most advanced defense countermeasures known to the world. This includes hardened skins, capable of surviving electromagnetic pulses caused by nuclear warhead detonations. Communications will, of course, be highly secured. As well as all the luxurious comforts on board, the 747s will be fitted with specialist environmental controls to protect both the people and the advanced equipment on board the plane. The Drive suggests this will include steep takeoff and landing, unique evasive maneuvers for attack avoidance, and more. Advertisement: Finally, the nature of the project means that the manual for the two VC-25s will have been produced in complete secrecy.

• boeing performance software manual.

Using current passenger, cargo, weather and runway conditions, it reduces maintenance costs by preventing engine wear and tear and increases revenue by optimizing passenger and cargo capacity. Coupled together with Jeppesen Airport Obstacle Database, no other product offers more precise calculations for your Boeing fleet than Onboard Performance Tool.Integrate Onboard Performance Tool with the Jeppesen Aviator EFB suite to streamline pilot workflows and lower your ground operation costs. This points to a longer recovery period and more pain for the industry and the global economy. Travel restrictions need to be lifted and relief measures continued. See de Juniac's media briefing of 28 July.Most airlines use programs supplied by the airplane manufacturers for each airplane type, and interface these programs with their own computer operating environment, airfield database, and data output format requirements. The result of that effort are the 6 SCAP Specifications, which define the interface requirements for airplane manufacturer supplied analysis software for implementation in the airline user environment. The 6 SCAP Specifications are: Takeoff, Landing, Climbout, Inflight, Noise and APM (Aircraft Performance Monitoring).The SCAP specifications are applicable to civil, transport category, airplanes. Maintenance and update of the SCAP Specifications has been the responsibility of the SCAP Task Force, meeting annually. We also use cookies for advertising purposes. Please see our privacy policy and cookies help page for complete information. It allows flight crews to calculate the takeoff analysis, landing analysis, and weight and balance information. Instant and accurate calculations save time by correcting for pressure variation, runway conditions, engine bleeds and Minimum Equipment List (MEL) items. Or call 1-800-MY-APPLE. Photo: Pxhere The world’s most expensive book.

It could not be instinctively disabled by pulling on the control yoke.The investigations identified numerous defects with associated systems, including an AoA disagree message that should have prevented MCAS activation.Generic stabilizer illustrated. Minimizing the functional differences between the Boeing 737 MAX and Next Generation aircraft variants allowed both variants to share the same type rating.The aerodynamic effect of its nacelles contributes to the aircraft's tendency to pitch up at high angles of attack (AOA).Test pilots routinely push aircraft to such extremes, as the FAA requires airplanes to perform as expected. Before the MCAS, test pilot Ray Craig determined the plane did not fly smoothly, in part due to the larger engines. Craig would have preferred an aerodynamic solution, but Boeing decided to implement a control law in software.MCAS used the stabilizer to change the column force feel, not trim the aircraft. This is a case of using the control surface in a new way that the regulations never accounted for and should have required an issue paper for further analysis by the FAA.Moreover, unlike runaway stabilizer, MCAS disables the control column response that 737 pilots have grown accustomed to and relied upon in earlier generations of 737 aircraft. On previous aircraft, one cutoff switch deactivates the thumb buttons on the control yoke that pilots use to move the horizontal stabilizer; the other cutoff switch disables automatic control (as from autopilot) to move the stabilizer in the tail. On the MAX, both switches do the same thing: they cut off all electric power to the stabilizer, both from the yoke buttons and from an automatic system, like MCAS.However it is itself all-moving about a single pivot and can be trimmed to adjust its angle. The trim is actuated via a jackscrew mechanism.These experts are concerned that the loads on the jack screw have potentially increased since the creation of the 737.

This will have meant that everything from the design to the content to the printing would have attracted high additional costs, over and above that which is usually incurred in aircraft manual production. The new planes will lose the iconic baby blue. This is in contradiction to the President’s many claims that he personally succeeded in driving down the cost of the aircraft. He has, however, redesigned the livery of the new airplane, shunning the iconic Kennedy baby blue for a more regal look. Are you excited to see the new Air Force Ones revealed. Or is the whole thing unnecessarily expensive. Advertisement: Joanna Bailey Editor - Joanna has worked in publishing for more than a decade and is fast becoming a go-to source for commercial aviation analysis. Providing commentary for outlets including the BBC, CNBC, and others, she works closely with IATA, AviaDev and various airlines and suppliers to get the inside track on the global marketplace. Related Articles: Daily Aviation News Email Sign up to our daily aviation news digest. Be in the know. Subscribe I want to subscribe to Simple Flying's daily email newsletter. Simple Flying won't sell your email, see our privacy policy here. Search for: Search Latest Stories Breaking: United Airlines Boeing 787 Evacuated In Newark Over Bomb Threat Qatar Airways Flying 23 Weekly Flights To Australia With Adelaide Resumption Vietnam Airlines Operates Its Boeing 787-10 From Houston A Look At Delta’s Short-Lived Airbus A310 Fleet Which Aircraft Will Embraer’s New Turboprop Compete Against. We use ads to keep our content free. Please Support us by turning off your adblocker. Disable my adblock Which adblocker are you using. Go back Continue without disabling I've disabled my adblock. Contrary to descriptions in news reports, however, Boeing claims that MCAS is not an anti-stall system. MCAS activated by input from only one of the airplane's two angle of attack sensors, making the system susceptible to a single point of failure.

This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the National Transportation Safety Board. Retrieved 2019-09-27. Retrieved March 21, 2019. May 24, 2019. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2019-07-27. Lay summary. Retrieved 2019-07-30. Retrieved 2019-11-15. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2019-08-27. Retrieved December 24, 2019. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain. Retrieved April 4, 2019. Retrieved October 8, 2019. Washington Post. The Seattle Times. Leeham News and Analysis. 2019-10-04. Retrieved 2019-10-07. Design of a pitch stability augmentation system. The Air Current. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Know how all of your items on board affects the flight through out all phases. The CG envelope reacts to each entry within the module - from fuel distribution, baggage compartments, pantry objects to crew and passengers. The result of this gives us our TOM and ALM for a specific flight. To speed up the process, we also let you configure default setups. When you have completed the module, we use the masses to perform the take off and landing analysis.Designed for use on Apple iPads or WindowsWireless updates are easy,If the configuration is not valid, you will get a red box telling the combination that is invalid and suggests how to solve it.Some of the advantages are increased engine life, fuel savings and reduced overhaul costs on maintenance. There are two methods of achieving this, either by a deration or assumed temperature.A deration electronically reduces the rated thrust of an engine to either a prespecified value or to a certain percentage.The performance penalties from the MMEL are implemented in the performance software. Once a MMEL item has been selected the performance penalties are applied.The idea behind is to only show vital information of the data card.

Counter-intuitively, to correct an excessive deflection causing a dive the pilot first pushes the nose down further, before easing back to gently raise the nose again. During this easing back period, the elevator deflection reduces or even reverses, its force on the jackscrew does likewise and the manual trim eases up. During the events leading to the two Max crashes, the stiffness of the manual trim wheel repeatedly prevented manual trim adjustment to correct the MCAS-induced nose-down pitching.Addressing American Airlines pilots, Boeing vice-president Mike Sinnett contradicted reports that the MCAS had a single-point failure, because the pilots themselves are the backup.TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA): Require that all transport-category aircraft present pilots with angle-of-attack info in a visual format, and that all air carriers train their pilots to use the info to obtain maximum possible airplane climb performance. The bits represent status flags such as whether MCAS is active, or whether the tail trim motor is energized. Engineers were able to simulate single event upsets and artificially induce MCAS activation by manipulating these signals.Retrieved 29 February 2020. Retrieved 2 March 2020. Retrieved March 13, 2019. Retrieved March 21, 2019. On January 21, 2019, Boeing submitted a proposed MCAS software enhancement to the FAA for certification. To date, the FAA has tested this enhancement to the 737 MAX flight control system in both the simulator and the aircraft. The testing, which was conducted by FAA flight test engineers and flight test pilots, included aerodynamic stall situations and recovery procedures. The FAA's ongoing review of this software installation and training is an agency priority, as will be the roll-out of any software, training, or other measures to operators of the 737 MAX. Retrieved May 19, 2019. Retrieved 2019-11-09. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2019-06-07. Retrieved 2019-10-18. Lay summary.

It dove just after the flight crew retracted the flaps. And it relentlessly activated its automatic pitch trim in the nose-down direction 28 times over the course of eight minutes. It was the first 737 Max accident in its 18 months of service. What could have brought down one of Boeing’s newest, most technologically sophisticated airplanes. But those closer to the airplane’s development knew better: there had been warning signs from the start. What emerged was a story of cascading failure — the many small human errors at every phase of the airplane’s design, certification, and operation process. Those errors came to a terrible and deadly climax in the skies above the Java Sea in October 2018 and above the Ethiopian countryside five months later. Sometimes this motivates them to new heights of innovation and progress. Other times, it prompts them to pull everything back in the name of cost-cutting. Together, both airplanes comprise nearly half of the world’s 28,000 commercial airliners. Chances are that if you’ve ever flown anywhere at all, you’ve flown on one of them. But complete overhauls are rare: the 737 last received one in 1997, with the debut of the third-generation 737NG, while the A320 hadn’t been refreshed since its launch in 1988. In secret, it had developed a more efficient version of the A320 called the A320neo (which stands for “new engine option”). It would burn about 6 percent less fuel than the 737NG.That was more orders than the 737s had received in the entirety of 2010. It had spent four years debating the future of its narrow-body jet program, and it still did not have an answer to its most basic question: whether Boeing should make a brand-new design or revamp the 737 yet again. The company would launch a fourth-generation 737, and it would do it in record time. That gave the company a head start on design and engineering work — enough, Boeing hoped, to allow the Max to enter service just months after the A320neo.

The first was the 737 platform itself. It would take a considerable amount of work to update a 46-year-old design with all of the technology it needed to be just as efficient as the competition. By law, a pilot can only fly one type of airplane at a time. However, the Federal Aviation Administration allows different models of airplanes with similar design characteristics to share a common “type certificate.” So, for instance, the 737’s three previous generations all have a common type certificate. When you get qualified on one model, you can fly all of them. As a result, many airlines limit themselves to aircraft from one manufacturer over the other. Some, like Ryanair and Southwest, only operate a single type of plane for maximum operational efficiency. But a type certificate is so detailed and comprehensive — covering everything from airplane dimensions to the configuration of the passenger cabin to the way the jet moves and feels in flight — that it can limit the amount of leeway designers have when trying to add a new model to an existing certificate. In essence, it had to be a cutting-edge, 21st century airplane that still felt and flew like ones designed when The Beatles were still together. To beat Airbus, it would have to break the one unbreakable law of project management: that a development cycle can’t be fast, cheap, and good.Two years into development, Boeing promised the Max would be 8 percent more fuel-efficient than the A320neo. Five and a half years in, the FAA granted the Max its Amended Type Certification. Just months later, the program’s chief pilot, Ed Wilson, boasted that pilots rated on previous versions of the 737 could switch to the Max with just “ 2.In theory, pilots could read about the Max at home, take a self-administered computer course in the morning, and be ready to fly in the afternoon. Software engineers had to settle for re-creating 40-year-old analog instruments in digital formats, rather than innovating and improving upon them.

Guru2 devices; managing documents sent to the device, providingDeveloped with transparency in mind, the communication betweenBackOffice brings a whole new level of flexibility and control toThe two main components of your EFB suite will be the Guru2 andThese work in perfect unison, synchronizingMaintaining the Guru2 through the BackOffice is what ensuresOur engine-outTakeoff Procedures, used by our renowned. Guru2 application.The Performance Wrapper is used for internally produced performance modules based on the AFM or manufacturer SCAP modules.Take a look at our We will gladly help you with any questions or queries you may have. Upgrade to a different browser or install Google Chrome Frame to experience this site. This version includes a new feature:. It enables any user, pilot or ground staff, to perform. To learn more or opt-out, read our Cookie Policy. Please also read our Privacy Notice and Terms of Use, which became effective December 20, 2019. Stick shakers are designed to warn pilots of an impending stall, which can cause a dangerous loss of control. They’re unmistakably loud for that reason. The captain ignored it. This required a bit more attention. So the captain passed control of the aircraft to the first officer and began the troubleshooting process from memory. It rushed the competing 737 Max to market as quickly as possible. Since the 737 Max was the same plane type as its predecessors, pilots would only need a 2.5-hour iPad training to fly its newest iteration. But its failure in both crashes was the result of Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration’s reluctance to properly inform pilots of its existence or to regulate it for safety. Nowhere in its amended type certification of the 737 Max is MCAS mentioned. A Boeing spokesperson said the company believes the system is still “a robust and effective way for the FAA to execute its oversight of safety.” Each system is fed by an independent set of sensors.

In this case, the captain checked both instrument panels against the backup, and he found that the instruments on his side — the left side — were getting bad data. So with the turn of a dial, the captain switched the primary displays to only use data from the working sensors on the right side of the airplane. Easy. He adjusted the throttle, set the aircraft on its optimal climb slope, and retracted the flaps. It lurched downward, its nose pointed toward the ground. He flicked a switch on his control column to counteract the dive. The airplane responded right away, pitching its nose back up. Five seconds later, it dove once again. It pitched back down. The QRH is a series of simple checklists that are designed to help pilots rapidly assess and manage “non-normal” situations. The idea is that Boeing has thought of every conceivable thing that might happen to one of its airplanes, and it has included all of them in the QRH. Basically, it’s more troubleshooting. At one point, the airplane pulled out of a 900-foot dive at an airspeed of almost 375 mph, which is uncomfortably close to the 737’s “redline” of 390 mph. Usually, this creates a constant up or downforce that the flight crew has to try to counteract for the remainder of the flight. It’s kind of like trying to drive when your wheels are out of alignment. It was intermittent, temporarily reversible, and it wasn’t even clear if the horizontal stabilizer was causing the problem. But they were running out of options. They followed the checklist and flipped the STAB TRIM switches to CUT OUT on the center console. Five seconds passed. Then five minutes. Once again, PK-LQP was under their control and out of danger. Following standard procedure, the captain reported the episode to the airline, and the airline’s maintenance team checked for serious equipment failures, finding none. Its stick shaker activated just after takeoff. It threw multiple errors on the flight display.

This was all done for the sake of keeping the Max within the constraints of its common type certificate. I don’t have the cockpit panels. I don’t have an instructor that I can ask questions to,” she says. “You’re hoping that the first time you see the Max is on a nice clear day. But sometimes it’s not, and you’re showing up at night or in bad weather into an airplane that has all these changes.” Eight days after the Lion Air crash, a bulletin appeared on MyBoeingFleet, the company’s online portal for pilots and airlines. It read: The confusing series of alerts. The sudden dives. The fact that this “failure condition” would keep occurring until and unless the crew flipped the STAB TRIM switches to CUT OUT — just like the crew on PK-LQP’s penultimate flight had correctly guessed. Even more frightening, Boeing only gave the bare minimum of information to airlines and pilots. The bulletin didn’t give the system a name or explain what it was designed to do in normal operation. It only said that sometimes it malfunctions, and that can crash your airplane. Finally, on November 10th, another message appeared on MyBoeingFleet: Like the 737 Max, MCAS was made to be a stopgap. These are much more efficient than the engines on the 737NG, but they are also much heavier and larger. The engines on the NG sit only 18 inches off the ground, and mounting the LEAP-1Bs in the same spot gave them too little clearance during takeoff. So Boeing placed them further forward and slightly higher on the wing of the Max. Due to their size and position, the engines on the Max create lift when the airplane enters a steep climb (or, in aviation parlance, at high angles of attack). This extra lift causes the Max to handle differently than previous versions of the 737, but only when it’s climbing steeply. In order for different airplane models to share a type certificate, the FAA requires that they all handle the same way.

A model of airplane with sensitive controls, like a sports car, can’t share a type certificate with a model whose controls are much more sluggish, like a semi truck. Boeing was concerned that the FAA might consider this enough to give the Max its own type rating, undermining one of its promised selling points. Because the problem only occurred in specific circumstances, Boeing couldn’t just slap an extra set of fins on the airplane and call it a day. Aerodynamic changes “work” all the time and require a lot of design and testing to get just right. Boeing needed something precisely targeted, carefully calibrated, and nonlinear in effect. It needed software. It would use an angle of attack (AoA) sensor to detect when the airplane entered a steep climb. It would activate the airplane’s pitch trim system, which is routinely used to help stabilize the airplane and make it easier to control, especially during climb and descent. And it would trim the airplane in modest increments for up to nine seconds at a time until it detected that the airplane had returned to a normal AoA and ended its steep climb. It seems simple enough — on paper, that is. ET-AVJ, another 737 Max 8 owned by Ethiopian Airlines, took off from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, bound for Nairobi, Kenya. In command was Yared Getachew, the airline’s youngest-ever captain. On his right was Ahmed Nur Mohammed, a fairly new first officer. The altitude and AoA indicators on one side of the airplane malfunctioned. About 90 seconds after takeoff, and immediately after the first officer retracted the flaps, the airplane dove unexpectedly. First Officer Mohammed, meanwhile, radioed air traffic control. Request vector for landing.” But every time the pilots gained a few hundred feet of altitude, MCAS pushed the airplane right back down again. Getachew concurred, and Mohammed flipped the switches to disable MCAS.

The crew had just a few hundred feet of altitude to work with, and at that speed and altitude, the aerodynamic forces on the airplane would have been immense, making it difficult to control. The airplane barely responded. Mohammed tried to adjust trim with the manual crank located on the center console. That didn’t work either. They must have believed that it was the only way to get the airplane back into a climb. Fifteen seconds later, the airplane crashed at over 500 knots of airspeed into a field near the town of Bishoftu, Ethiopia. None of the 157 people aboard survived. By the next day, regulators around the world began to ground the airplane. Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg reportedly called President Trump to assure him that the 737 Max was safe to fly. Muilenburg admitted that MCAS was directly responsible for both crashes and promised that Boeing would fix its broken system. “It’s our responsibility to eliminate this risk,” he said. “We own it and we know how to do it.” The answer might be infuriatingly simple: nobody read the paperwork. Boeing already has the people and the expertise, it pays better, and it isn’t susceptible to government shutdowns.In the case of the 737 Max, the FAA’s list extends to 30 pages, reviewing everything from engine noise to de-icing systems, aluminum fatigue to security doors. The lowest-severity systems should only cause “some inconvenience” to passengers, while the more serious “hazardous” and “catastrophic” failure conditions can endanger the aircraft and its passengers. The more severe the failure condition, the more redundancies that system is supposed to have. MCAS received a “hazardous failure” designation. This meant that, in the FAA’s judgment, any kind of MCAS malfunction would result in, at worst, “a large reduction in safety margins” or “serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the occupants.

” Such systems, therefore, need at least two levels of redundancy, with a chance of failure less than 1 in 10 million. That makes MCAS completely unable to cope with a sensor malfunction. It can’t “sanity check” its data against a second sensor or switch to a backup if the original source fails. It just believes whatever data it’s given, even if that data is bad, which is what happened on Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302. Sure, that’s a low rate, but it’s still nearly six times above what the FAA allows for “hazardous” systems: they’re only supposed to fail once every 10 million flight-hours. On paper, MCAS was only supposed to move the horizontal stabilizer 0.6 degrees at a time. In reality, it could move the stabilizer as much as 2.5 degrees at a time, making it significantly more powerful when forcing the nose of the airplane down. Nobody did anything malicious. Nobody did anything wrong, in a strictly technical sense. Its executives personally made tens of millions of dollars in bonuses for hitting their corporate performance targets, thanks, in large part, to the record-setting pace of 737 Max sales. With its bottom line threatened, Boeing focused on speed instead of rigor, cost-control instead of innovation, and efficiency instead of transparency. The FAA got caught up in Boeing’s rush to get the Max into production, arguably failing to enforce its own safety regulations and missing a clear opportunity to prevent these two crashes. A week of mourning followed the crash in Addis Ababa. Relatives of the victims flew in from Kenya, Canada, and China. Others who lived in Ethiopia were bused to the capital by the airline. The airplane had struck the ground with so much force that there were no identifiable remains. Instead, families received bags of soil from the surrounding fields.

It now refers to failures per total flight-hours rather than total flights, and only considers commercial passenger flights (not cargo or private flights) in its calculation. Computer System (PDCS), the Flight Management Computer (FMC) was a huge Smiths Industries (formerly Lear Seigler) has It enabled EPR and ASI bugs to be set by the computer and advise on the optimum It was trialed on two in-service The 737-200 showed average FMC is just one component. Most aircraft have just one FMC, but there is an Oceanic areas. The FMS can be defined as being capable of four dimensional area There are normally 2 CDUs but only one FMC. Think of it as The CDU in the photograph has a. DIR INTC key at the beginning of the second row but some have a MENU key. This This was increased to 192k words in MACTOW, it takes inputs from the fuel summation unit to give a gross weight and It will also compute the aircrafts position based upon inputs from the IRSs, GPS For a full list of all FMC The Permanent database cannot be modified by crew. There are four types of data. Waypoint, Navaid, Airport and Runway. Runway data is only held in the permanent SUPP data can only be entered on theAll TemporaryNAV DATA database, you will be box prompted for a four letter “CLASS”Selecting MSG RECALL allows the recall of deleted CDU scratchpad messages whose set logic is still valid. ALTN DEST allows the entry of selected alternate airports. This may be used to avoid the turbulent wake of the aircraft ahead or to increase separation with opposite direction traffic. Note that if a model is appended “.2” it has the SFP package and two position tailskid. Also check the database effectivity and expiry dates. Software update numberSee below toThe range of CI is 0-200 (Classics) and 0-500 (NGs). If you enter the forecast top-of-climb wind before departure the FMC will recalculate your climb speed accordingly.